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Comments
Chemical Castration: An Alternative to
Incarceration
In March, 1992, Steven Allen Butler, an accused rapist, asked a
Texas District Judge to punish him via castration rather than im-
prisonment.' Judge Michael McSpadden initially agreed to his re-
quest, but later withdrew approval after amassed outcry from civil
libertarians and legal experts. One physician, having agreed to per-
form the procedure, subsequently withdrew his agreement. 2 At the
same time, Butler's family insisted that he was "braiiwashed" into
volunteering.
Eight years earlier, a Michigan judge sentenced Roger Gaun-
tlett,3 a convicted rapist, to one year in prison plus five years of
probation conditional on Gauntlett's receipt of regular injections of
Depo-Provera,4 referred to in medical circles as "chemical castra-
1. Richard Lacayo, Sentences Inscribed on Flesh, Time 54 (March 23, 1992).
2. The American Medical Association strongly opposes the employment of medical
procedures in conjunction with criminal sanctions. Dr. George Annas, a professor of health
at Boston University Medical School states "Physicians have no business acting as agents of
the state to punish people." Lacayo, Time at 59 (cited in note 1).
3. Ironically, Roger Gauntlett is the heir to the Upjohn Pharmaceutical Corporation
fortune. Upjohn manufactured the drug Depo-Provera. John T. Melella, Sheldon Travin
and Ken Cullen, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Use of Antiandrogens in Treating Sex
Offenders, 17 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law 223, 228 (1989).
4. Depo-Provera is a psychotropic drug which controls sexual behavior via reduction
of one's "sex drive" by reducing the level of the male hormone testosterone. The use of
Depo-Provera results in a reduction of genital functioning, including reduction of spermato-
genesis, erection and ejaculation; it does not, however, result in total impotence. See, Com-
ment, Sexual Offenders and the Use of Depo-Provera, 22 San Diego L Rev 565, 567 (1985).
Depo-Provera has recently been approved by the Food and Drug Administration for use
in the United States as a form of female birth control. Warren E. Leary, U.S. Approves
Injectable Drug as Birth Control, The New York Times 1 (October 30, 1992).
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tion."5 Not surprisingly, Mr. Gauntlett vehemently opposed the
treatment and appealed the sentence.6
The response of the criminal justice system in dealing with sex
offenders raises serious legal, medical and ethical questions. Not
only are sex offenses traumatic for the victim and his or her family,
but society as a whole has a substantial interest in the deterrence
of such crimes as well. To a large extent, courts have thus far re-
lied almost exclusively on incarceration, either in prisons or mental
institutions, to, curb such behavior. Such approaches, however,
have been unsuccessful in reducing the number and recidivism of
offenses.7
This comment will explore castration as an alternative to incar-
ceration for convicted sex offenders. More specifically, emphasis
will be given to the use of pharmacological treatments as a condi-
tion of probation and the plausibility of such treatment in light of
the United States Constitution. Further, attention will be given to
statutory questions, such as the reasonableness of court ordered
probation conditioned upon the receipt of treatment. Finally, con-
sideration will be given to the defendant and whether voluntary
consent to such a condition can truly be given.
BACKGROUND
Compulsory physical castration has been widely practiced for
thousands of years.' In the Middle Ages, individuals were castrated
as a punishment according to the lex talionis', ie, "an eye for an
eye, a tooth for a tooth."10 In Greece, slaves were castrated for
commercial purposes and harem guards in the Middle East were
5. Order of Probation, People v Gauntlett, No D 824-00-076 FY (Mich Cir Ct,
Kalamazoo County, Jan 30 1989); 134 Mich App 737, 352 NW2d 310, 313, modified, 419
Mich 909, 353 NW2d 463 (1984). (quoting trial court's probation order).
6. The Court of Appeals found that the trial judge had imposed an illegal probation
condition. Gauntlett, 352 NW2d at 314-17. The Court first indicated that there was no stat-
utory authority for treating a sex offender with the drug. Id at 314-15. Second, the Court
noted that Depo-Provera had not gained acceptance in the medical community as safe and
reliable and was still considered experimental. Id at 316. Finally, the Court noted a problem
in complete lack of informed consent by the Defendant. Id.
7. See Comment, 22 San Diego L Rev at 565-66 (cited in note 4).
8. Nickolaus Heim and Carolyn J. Hursch, Castration for Sex Offenders: Treatment
or Punishment? A Review and Critique of Recent European Literature, 8 Archives of Sex-
ual Behavior 281 (1979).
9. Lex talonis is the law "which requires the infliction upon a wrongdoer of the same
injury which he has caused to another." Black's Law Dictionary 913 (West, 6th ed 1990).
10. Heim and Hursch, 8 Archives of Sexual Behavior-at 281-82 (cited in note 8).
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castrated to prevent them from self-indulgence.1" In fact, since
1906, castration has been used as a treatment for sex offenders in
several European countries.12 Indeed, until 1970, surgical castra-
tion of sex offenders was compulsory in post-war Germany. 3
Today, the use of surgical castration as a treatment for sex of-
fenders is statutorily regulated in European countries."' In the
United States, however, surgical castration of sex offenders has not
met with a favorable reception. For instance, one court has held
that a Nevada statute providing for physical castration of rapists
by vasectomy was unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punish-
ment. 15 Another court has found unconstitutional an Iowa Statute
requiring the sterilization of men convicted of a second felony."6
11. Tauber, Effects of Castration Upon the Sexuality of the Adult Male, 2 Psycho-
somatic Med 74 (1940).
12. Heim and Hursch, 8 Archives of Sexual Behavior at 282 (cited in note 8). Den-
mark was the first country to legalize castration as a medical treatment in 1929. Other coun-
tries quickly followed suit: Germany (1933, 1935, 1969), Norway (1934), Finland (1935,
amended 1950), Estonia (1937), Iceland (1938), Latvia (1938) and Sweden (1944). Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Under the most recent German statute, for example, castration is permitted
only in the following circumstances:
(1) if the treatment is indicated according to the knowledge of medical science to
prevent, cure, or ease serious diseases, mental disorders, or complaints of the subject
that result from his abnormal sexual drive, or (2) if, because of the subject's abnormal
sexual drive, his character, and his previous manner of living, it may be assumed that
he will commit further sexual offenses, again given that castration is indicated ac-
cording to the knowledge of medical science to meet this risk, and that it is thus
possible to help the person with regard to his future way of life. Whether the opera-
tion will be effected or not depends on the vote of an independent commission of
experts. People who because of insanity are unable to understand the whole proce-
dure and the meaning of the operation must be represented by a guardian.
Id.
15. Mickle v Henrichs, 262 F 687 (D Nev 1918). The Court stated: "Vasectomy in
itself is not cruel; it is no more cruel than branding, the amputation of a finger, the slitting
of a tongue, or the cutting off of an ear; but, when resorted to as punishment, it is ignomini-
ous and degrading, and in that sense is cruel." Mickle, 262 F at 690.
16. Davis v Berry, 216 F 413 (S D Iowa 1914). The court noted that the Iowa statute
was intended to apply to all second conviction's, regardless of the felony. Davis, 216 F at
417. In Iowa, this included not only murder, arson, rape, etc., but also crimes that had once
been considered misdemeanors, such as wife abandonment, cutting electric light wires, or
breaking an electric globe. Id at 417-18. Thus, the court considered the statute inherently
cruel and unusual. Id at 417. In commenting on the statute under consideration, the Iowa
court stated:
When Blackstone wrote his commentaries he did not mention castration as one of the
cruel punishments, quite likely for the reason that with the advance of civilization the
operation was looked upon as too cruel, and was no longer performed. But each oper-
ation is to destroy the power of procreation. It is, of course, to follow the man during
the balance of his life. The physical suffering may not be so great, but that is not the
only test of cruel punishment; the humiliation, the degradation, the mental suffering
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 31:307
This view was subsequently affirmed in State v Brown, wherein
the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that castration is pro-
hibited by the constitutional mandate against cruel and unusual
punishment.17 Modern day opponents of castration argue that
"castration of any kind is morally pernicious and pragmatically
impotent.""8
DEPO-PROVERA
While surgical castration is an unlikely alternative to prison on
humanitarian and civil liberty grounds, another option exists. First
tested in the 1960's, the use of hormone suppressors, ie, "chemical
castration," has been very successful in the treatment of sex of-
fenders.19 Today, the most common treatment involves the admin-
istration of medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA), a synthetic pro-
gesterone, manufactured under the trade name Depo-Provera.2"
Depo-Provera is a long-acting injectable form of MPA which in-
hibits sexual drives and sexually dangerous behavior by reducing
the production of testosterone." Essentially, Depo-Provera re-
stricts the release of luteinizing hormones (LH)22 from the pitui-
tary gland, which in turn decreases androgen levels, particularly
testosterone, in the bloodstream.23 Clinically, Depo-Provera dimin-
are always present and known by all the public, and will follow him wheresoever he
may go. This belongs to the Dark Ages.
Id at 416.
17. 284 SC 407, 326 SE2d 410 (1985). In Brown, the trial judge sentenced three sex
offenders to 30 years in prison, provided, however, that the sentence be suspended if the
defendants agreed to surgical castration. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, while ac-
knowledging that the trial judge has wide discretion in ordering suspension or probation,
indicated that castration was a form of mutilation and thus prohibited as a violation of
public policy. Brown, 326 SE2d at 411-12.
18. Douglas J. Besharov and Andrew Vachhs, Is Castration an Acceptable Punish-
ment?, ABA Journal 43 (July 1992). In support of this-view, the author cited a case from
Germany wherein a man eluded -life imprisonment by submitting to castration. The man
began receipt of hormone injections, and proceeded to strangle .a seven year old girl and
bury her body. At trial, the defense claimed that the castration had removed any sexual
feelings that the defendant may have had prior to receiving treatment. Thus, the defense
attempted to use the defendant's castration as proof that the crime was not sexually moti-
vated. Besharov and Vachhs, ABA Journal at 43.
19. See Generally, Fred S. Berlin, The Paraphilias and Depo-Provera: Some Medi-
cal, Ethical and Legal Considerations, 17 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law 233 (1989).
20. Physicians Desk Reference, 42nd Ed, 2123-24 (1988).
21. Melella, 17 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law at 225 (cited in note 3).
22. LH is the chemical messenger which activates the production of the male hor-
mone, androgen, in the testicles. Hence, the use of Depo-Provera results in decreased andro-
gen levels. Androgen is a sexual activator. Id.
23. Id.
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ishes compulsive erotic fantasy and lowers male sex drive.24 With-
out it, sex offenders report inability to control their sexually offen-
sive behavior.2 5
The physiological effects of Depo-Provera are temporary dimi-
nution of penile erections and ejaculations, and a decrease of
sperm production.26 Dosages can be titrated to obviate total impo-
tence and the medication is not feminizing.27 Various side effects
have been reported, including weight gain, cold sweats, nightmares,
muscle weakness and fatigue.28 Studies on animals have also shown
that Depo-Provera causes breast cancer in female dogs and uterine
cancer in monkeys.2 9 More importantly, however, is the fact that
the few documented side-effects are believed to be fully reversible
with cessation of treatment. 30 In fact, within seven to ten days,
erective and ejaculatory abilities are restored, as well as sex drive.
3 1
DEPO PROVERA AS A TREATMENT FOR SEX OFFENDERS: APPROPRIATE
CANDIDATES
Presently there are few effective treatment methods available
that significantly reduce the incidence or recurrence of sexually of-
fensive behavior. Thus, in view of the high rate of recidivism
among sex offenders, the time has come for the legal system to be
innovative and to accept the challenge of controlling deviant sexual
behavior through the use of Depo-Provera.
Subsequent to being convicted of a sex crime, the offender may
be incarcerated, either in a mental institution or in a prison, or
may be granted probation with various conditions. If incarcerated,
chemical treatment becomes irrelevant; however, in the present so-
cial climate regarding such offenses, a strong pressure clearly exists
not to imprison convictees and thus the option of chemical treat-
ment is relevant. The complexity of the choice between incarcera-
tion and treatment often lies in the wide divergence of views of
sexually deviant behavior. 2 More specifically, the legal system
views sexual deviation as a violation of the criminal law resulting
24. Id.
25. Comment, 22 San Diego L Rev at 567 (cited in note 4).






32. Id at 224.
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in punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation or a combination of the
three. 33 In contrast, sexual deviation is also viewed as a medical
problem for which punishment is not morally appropriate. 4 Conse-
quently, punishment may not accomplish a continuing deterrent
effect. Moreover, since states are obligated to protect society from
harm, there may still be an ethical obligation to control deviant
behavior by deterrence or rehabilitation. In any event, it seems ob-
vious that both society and the offender would receive a greater
benefit if the offender is rehabilitated and does not resume the un-
lawful behavior.3 To do so, however, the appropriate candidates
for treatment need to be identified.
Experts have classified the types of sex offenders into four
groups. The Type I offender denies the perpetration of the crime. 6
Type II offenders admit to the perpetration of the offense, but
blame their criminal behavior on non-sexual or non-personal forces
(eg: drugs, alcohol or job stress).3 7 Type III offenders are violent
and appear to be prompted by non-sexual reasons (eg: anger,
power or violence).38 Type IV offenders are paraphiliacs39 who
demonstrate a pattern of sexual arousal, erection and ejaculation,
which is accompanied by a distinctive fantasy or its achievement.4 °
The pivotal criterion in calculating the treatability of a sex of-
fender is his acknowledgement that his conduct is intolerable and
beyond his control.4' Accordingly, therapists advocate that the
only alternative for the first three types of sexual offenders is in-
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See generally Lawrence Taylor and Katharina Dalton, Premenstrual Syndrome:
A New Criminal Defense?, 19 Cal W L Rev 269, 284 (1983).
36. Edward A. Fitzgerald, Chemical Castration: MPA Treatment of the Sexual Of-
fender, 18 Am J Crim L 1, 4 (1990).
37. Fitzgerald, 18 Am J Crim L at 4.
38. Id.
39. A paraphilia is a sexual deviation disorder; recognized paraphilias include voyeur-
ism, exhibitionism, transvestism, fetishism, erotic sadism, sexual masochism and pedophilia
(sexual attraction to children). Fred S. Berlin and Carl F. Meineke, Treatment of Sex Of-
fenders with Antiandrogenic Medication: Conceptualization, Review of Treatment Modali-
ties, and Preliminary Findings, 138 Am J Psychiatry 601 (1981).
40. Fitzgerald, 18 Am J Crim L at 4.
41. A diagnosis of paraphilia can be made by observing an individual's cognitive,
emotional and behavioral state. Cognitive examination with disclose a pattern of perverted
sexual fantasies. Emotional exam will identify erotic cravings which can be alleviated only
by carrying out the fantasies. Ergo, these cravings are perceived as harmful when not carried
out. Finally, behavioral examination shows general stereotyped sexual activity because
"erotic pleasure is maximized only when deviant fantasies are carried out." Berlin and
Meineke, 138 Am J Psychiatry at 601 (cited in note 39).
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carceration.42 Because the Type I offender denies that his behavior
is wrong, he can probably not be helped by Depo-Provera treat-
ment. Likewise, as the Type II offender blames his behavior on
"other" forces, the individual would probably not be responsive to
treatment which focuses on sexual feelings rather that non-per-
sonal forces. Finally, the Type III compulsive sex offenders, hostile
rapists and those who commit sex crimes motivated by power or
anger are not amenable to treatment with Depo-Provera.43 As
these offenders are generally acting out of other criminal impulses,
therapy which concentrates on the diminution of one's sex drive
holds little promise for this group.
On the other hand, an individual who feels remorse or guilt, but
who is unable to "control" his behavior is more likely to respond to
Depo-Provera treatment and counseling than the individual with
little regard for the damage he has done. As such, experts have
found Type IV offenders excellent candidates for Depo-Provera,
claiming that treatment is highly effective in controlling "unremit-
ting fantasies and the cessation of unwanted sexual acting out."""
It is therefore critical that the sex offender considered for treat-
ment go through a painstaking process of screening and evaluation
to ascertain his amenability to treatment. Once properly diag-
nosed, the offender, if he consents, can undergo treatment. If con-
sent is not forthcoming, or if the offender is an inappropriate can-
didate, other alternatives must be considered.
PROBATION
According to the Supreme Court, probation is "the attempted
saving of a man who has taken one wrong step and whom the judge
thinks to be a brand who can be plucked from burning at the time
of the imposition of the sentence." In other words, probation re-
flects the overriding concern with the rehabilitation of the of-
fender. 6 A condition of probation is acceptable if it is rationally
related to the rehabilitation of the offender, protects the public
against subsequent offenses, deters future misconduct or condigns
42. Comment, 22 San Diego L Rev at 582 (cited in note 4).
43. Once properly'diagnosed, the offender may be legally treated with Depo-Provera.
Depo-Provera is not experimental and can be prescribed by any physician under the Food
and Drug Administration Guidelines. Berlin, 17 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law at 235 (cited
in note 19).
44. Comment, 22 San Diego L Rev at 582 (cited in note 4).
45. US v Murray, 275 US 347, 358 (1928).




Opponents to the use of Depo-Provera assert that requiring such
treatment as a probation condition is unacceptable. First, critics
profess that Depo-Provera treatment is unrelated to the accused's
behavior to the extent that rape is a crime of hatred and anger.'
Insofar as Depo-Provera only temporarily reduces the offender's
sex drive, it is unrelated to the accused's future criminality.' 9 Sec-
ond, critics urge that probation requirements must be performable
during the probation period; Depo-Provera, opponents claim,
would have to be used for life to be effective.5" Finally, opponents
argue that the cost and lack of availability should preclude the use
of Depo-Provera as a condition of probation. 1
Conversely, advocates of Depo-Provera treatment argue that
such treatment should be an acceptable condition of probation for
several reasons. First, studies have shown that present rehabilita-
tion approaches, including incarceration, are ineffective agents for.
deterring future crime. 2 Nationally, convicted rapists serve an av-
erage of less that six years in jail, and incarceration tends to
"mask" rehabilitation. 3 Incredibly, studies show that as many as
59 percent of individuals treated by incarceration alone repeat
their crimes.5 ' Second, as medical research has shown that Depo-
Provera treatment is effective only in certain offenders (sex offend-
ers driven by overwhelming sexual fantasies), violent sex offenders,
acting vis-a-vis rage, anger and hatred are unacceptable candidates
for treatment. Finally, judicial acceptance of Depo-Provera ther-
apy as a probation condition should result in increased availability
and treatment, which, in conjunction with counseling, would not
have to be administered for life. Moreover, treatment with Depo-
47. Tonry, 605 F2d at 148.
48. William Green, Depo-Provera, Castration, and the Probation of Rape Offenders:
Statutory and Constitutional Issues, 12 U Dayton L Rev 1, 13 (1986).
49. Green, 12 U Dayton L Rev at 13.
50. Id at 14. Green argues that since treatments do not permanently eradicate or
diminish sexual potency and that since the offender may obtain testosterone illegally to
restore sex drive, an offer of probation would have to be conditioned on lifetime treatment.
Id. But see contra, Fitzgerald, 18 Am J Crim L at 17 (the offender cannot counteract the
effect of Depo-Provera by taking testosterone supplements).
51. Id.
52. See Laurence French, A Practitioner's Notes on Treating Sexual Deviance, 68
Psychological Reports 1195, 1196 (1991).
53. Besharov and Vachhs, ABA Journal at 42 (cited in note 18).
54. S. Steven Yang, Treatability of the Sex Offender: Considerations of Etiology,




Provera can easily be administered and monitored.55
INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT AND INFORMED CONSENT
The context in which Depo-Provera treatment is given is critical
to both its legality in treating sex offenders and to its ethical us-
age. With this in mind, it is unlikely that a state can force an of-
fender to accept Depo-Provera treatment without violating the of-
fender's rights. This is especially true given that probation cannot
be imposed unless the offender knowingly and voluntarily accepts
it.5 6
In Canterbury v Spence,57 the court stated that "the root pre-
mise [of the doctrine of informed consent] is the concept, funda-
mental in American Jurisprudence, that 'every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body. .' 5 In making an informed decision
regarding treatment, the offender must be given an opportunity to
intelligently weigh the options available and the risks associated on
each. 9 Thus, the doctrine of informed consent requires that the
defendant be told all relevant information regarding treatment, in-
cluding any material risks to his well-being. 0
If a judge offers a convicted sex offender Depo-Provera treat-
ment as a condition of probation, the standards established in
Canterbury provide definitive instruction for fully informing 'the
offender. For instance, the offender should be told the short-term
physiological side effects and benefits of treatment. Additionally,
the offender is presumably entitled to know certain statistical fac-
tors, such as recividism rates. For example, if Depo-Provera is pro-
vided to the offender, he will not only be spared the debilitating
effects of incarceration, but also is more likely to be rehabilitated
and less likely to repeat the crime. Ergo, the offender can return to
the community where he can readjust to society and can maintain
social and family ties. Without treatment, however, the offender
55. One author suggests that the offender be responsible to arrange for treatments
with a physician. If the offender fails to receive treatment, the probation department would
be notified and probation revoked. Fitzgerald, 18 Am J Crim L at 16-17 (cited in note 36).
56. Green, 12 U Dayton L Rev at 15 (cited in note 48).
57. 464 F2d 772, 780 (DC Cir 1972), cert denied, 409 US 1064 (1972).
58. Canterbury, 464 F2d at 780, citing Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital,
211 NY 125, 105 NE 92, 93 (1914).
59. Canterbury, 464 F2d at 780.
60. Id. A risk is material when "a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or
should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or
cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed therapy." Id at 787.
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must face incarceration. If incarcerated, the offender may not be
rehabilitated and the potential for recidivism cannot be elimi-
nated. 1 In fact, the offender may very well continue to pose a
threat to society as a whole.2
A second hurdle also exists with respect to informed consent,
i.e., that consent must be made freely and voluntarily. Specifically,
it has been questioned whether an individual facing incarceration
can provide voluntary consent to accept treatment knowing that
refusal will lead to imprisonment. 3 Admittedly, such a decision
can be difficult, and in fact, some courts have recognized the possi-
bility of inherent coercion with respect to the ability of an involun-
tarily committed individual to give consent. An individual does not
necessarily lose his/her capacity to choose, however, just because a
decision is difficult.
6 4
In general, courts have concluded that the less invasive the
treatment, the more inclined the court will be to find that consent
is voluntary. 5 In Kaimowitz v Michigan Dept. of Mental Health,6
the court held that an involuntarily committed mental patient
could not consent to experimental psychosurgery when the of-
fender's release might depend on his consent. The court identified
three factors to determine if consent was informed: competence,
knowledge and voluntariness.6 7 Based on these factors, the court
concluded that (1) since the offender had been incarcerated for fif-
teen years, his decision-making ability had eroded; (2) that there
was not enough information pertaining to "experimental psycho-
surgery"; and (3) that the inequality of bargaining power between
the parties in an inherently coercive institutional environment
made the offender unable to give consent. 8
While it is true that a convicted sex offender is faced with only
two options, either incarceration or treatment, it does not necessa-
rily follow that the offender is unable to give consent. In
Kaimowitz, the risks of experimental surgery clearly outweighed
61. See French, 68 Psychological Reports 1195 (cited in note 52).
62. Id.
63. Besharov and Vachhs, ABA Journal at 43 (Cited in note 18).
64. For example, cancer patients are often faced with a choice between accepting un-
pleasant chemical agents or dying.
65. Fitzgerald, 18 Am J Crim L at 22 (cited in note 36).
66. Civil No 73-19434-AW (Cir Ct, Wayne County, Mich, July 10, 1973), summarized
in 42 USLW 2063 (July 31, 1973); Note, Kaimowitz v Department of Mental Health: A
Right to be Free from Experimental Surgery, 54 BU L Rev 301 (1974).




the benefits. With regard to Depo-Provera, however, there is no
reason to believe that the offender cannot make an informed
choice. First, if treatment is offered immediately, then the possibil-
ity that the defendant's decision-making ability will diminish via
long-term imprisonment is avoided.
Second, unlike "experimental psychosurgery," there is a sub-
stantial amount of research data and complete medical studies
with regard to Depo-Provera treatment. Thus, it is clear that
Depo-Provera treatment works and, in fact, has resulted in recidi-
vism rates of less than 5 percent. 9 Moreover, the uncertainties
posed by experimental surgery are eliminated. Nor does Depo-
Provera have the same magnitude of dangerousness, intrusiveness
or irreversibility of benefit to the patient and to society as does
experimental surgery. It can also be argued that administering
therapeutic medication to a willing convictee is very different than
using him to study the effects of a drug or medical procedure unre-
lated to his potential benefit.70
Third, the offender does have the option to refuse treatment.
Consequently, in cases where the offender chooses to undergo
treatment, the defendant's choice is controlling throughout the
process. In fact, the defendant has the option to withdraw from
treatment at any time even if treatment is considered beneficial.7"
Finally, inequality of bargaining power always exists with re-
spect to the relationship between an offender and the state. Thus,
if the accused's consent is negated as being a condition of proba-




Sentencing an offender to probation as an alternative to incar-
ceration must occur in a manner consistent with his constitutional
rights. These rights implicated by the offer of Depo-Provera treat-
ment generally have a common concern; they involve the common
theme of individual freedom. The first, known as freedom of integ-
69. Besharov and Vachhs, ABA Journal at 42 (cited in note 18).
70. See Bailey v Lally, 481 F Supp 203 (D Md 1979), wherein prisoners participated
in "non-therapeutic" experiments involving the testing of live viruses. The Supreme Court
held that conditions of incarceration were not so despotic as to make participation involun-
tary. Bailey, 481 F Supp at 221. Thus, imprisonment alone was not enough to make consent
involuntary.
71. Canterbury, 464 F2d at 779-83.
72. Fitzgerald, 18 Am J Crim L at 24 (cited in note 36).
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rity, involves the individual's right to be free from both mental and
physical government interference. 73 Mental integrity is the right to
be free from state imposed thought control and is protected by the
First Amendment and the right to privacy.74 Bodily integrity,
which is protected by the Eighth Amendment, mandates that an
individual be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
75
The second freedom, known as the freedom of autonomy, in-
volves an individual's right to engage in certain activities. Further
divided into its mental and physical elements, mental autonomy
involves the right to receive and generate one's own thoughts and
is protected by the First Amendment.76 Bodily autonomy involves
"the freedom to generate behaviors" and is protected by the pri-
vacy components of the Fourteenth Amendment. 77
Eighth Amendment
Although states have broad discretion to punish offenders who
violate state laws, this power is, nonetheless, subject to the Eighth
Amendment limitation on cruel and unusual punishment. Conse-
quently, whether a state can intrude upon a sex offender's body via
treatment with Depo-Provera as a condition of probation depends
on the extent that such treatment contravenes the cruel and un-
usual clause. The answer to that question depends on two factors:
(1) whether Depo-Provera, used as a condition of probation, is a
treatment or punishment, and (2) whether such condition is cruel
and unusual.
In Rennie v Klein,71 the district court for New Jersey held that a
defendant being forced to take medication did not infringe upon
his eighth amendment rights because the drug was proven effective
and was an integral part of an overall treatment program.79 In so
holding, the court established a four-prong test to determine
whether therapy constitutes treatment or punishment: (1) does the
drug have therapeutic value?; (2) is the drug recognized as ac-
73. Comment, Madness and Medicine: The Forcible Administration of Psychotropic
Drugs, 1980 Wis L Rev 497, 502-3 (1980).
74. Comment, 1980 Wis L Rev at 508.
75. Id at 520.
76. Id at 508.
77. Id.
78. 462 F Supp 1131 (D NJ 1978).
79. Rennie, 462 F Supp at 1143. In Rennie, the plaintiff, an involuntary patient at
Acora Psychiatric Hospital, sought to enjoin defendant psychiatrist from forcibly adminis-
tering drugs to him in a non-emergency situation. The plaintiff objected to the drug
Prolixin, a psychotropic drug, the effects of which last approximately two weeks. Id at 1136.
Vol. 31:307
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cepted medical practice?; (3) is the drug a part of an ongoing ther-
apeutic program?; and (4) even though it may have long-term ben-
efits, are the drug's adverse effects unreasonably harsh? °
Applying the four part Rennie test to Depo-Provera, the drug is
arguably a legitimate medical treatment for sex offenders. First,
Depo-Provera offers a great therapeutic value; it reduces the level
of testosterone, thus relieving the defendant from an urge that was
formerly "insistent, commanding and not subject to voluntary con-
trol." ' Second, Depo-Provera is not considered experimental and
is only administered with medical supervision. 2 Moreover, Depo-
Provera has become increasingly accepted. In fact, one author
noted that there has been a "growing willingness of judges to con-
dition probation or reduce sentences based upon the offender's
participation in such treatment."8 Third, Depo-Provera is admin-
istered as part of an ongoing therapeutic process. The treatment
eradicates the offender's compulsive sexual drive and makes him
more amenable to therapy which in turn allows the offender to
continue alignment of his life. Finally, the benefits of Depo-
Provera treatment far outweigh any adverse side-effects. For, while
the offender may experience some short term effects, there appar-
ently are no long term side effects.8 4 Moreover, the sexually inhib-
iting functions and suppression of the sex drive are only tempo-
rary. Thus, unlike physical castration or vasectomy, the effects are
reversible; full sexual drive, fantasy, and function return to the of-
fender within 7-10 days following cessation of treatment.
8 5
Given that Depo-Provera has been reported to be "the most ef-
fective form of clinical management for the sexual offender on pro-
bation,"8 " and is no longer an experimental procedure, certainly
the use of Depo-Provera as a condition of probation can be classi-
fied as treatment rather than punishment. Federal court decisions,
however, have virtually eliminated any distinguishment between
treatment and punishment for the purpose of Eighth Amendment
80. Rennie, 462 F Supp at 1143.
81. See, Melella, 17 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law at 225. (cited in note 3).
82. See note 43 and accompanying text.
83. Yang, 8 Med Law at 322 (1989) (cited in note 54).
84. The fact that long-term side effects are unknown could pose a potential drawback
in cases wherein the argument is raised that prisoners are being subject to experimentation.
However, in light of the voluminous literature and case studies of the effect of Depo-
Provera, and considering that treatment is suggested only where consent is given, the suc-
cess of the "being subject to an experiment" argument is minimal at best.
85. See notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
86. Fitzgerald, 18 Am J Crim Law at 17 (cited in note 36).
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analysis. For example, in Knecht v Gillman, the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit held that it was cruel and unusual punish-
ment when a behavioral modification program at a medical facility
for criminally insane used a drug which induced vomiting.8 7 The
court found that because vomiting was a painful and debilitating
experience, the drug had no therapeutic value.8
Similarly, in Mackey v Procunier, the Ninth Circuit court ruled
that injecting inmates with Succinylcholine, a paralysis inducing
drug, was cruel and unusual punishment. 9 The court indicated
that since Succinylcholine was not recommended for fully con-
scious patients, the staff could potentially employ psychiatry ex-
perimentation without the patients' consent.90 Consequently,
Depo-Provera treatment must also be analyzed as a form of
punishment.
The Supreme Court has enunciated three separate tests which
address whether punishment is cruel and unusual under the
Eighth Amendment. The first test, whether the punishment is in-
herently cruel,9 1 must be judged by the standards of modern soci-
ety and the effects on the offender.92 While surgical castration ar-
guably is "inherently cruel," Depo-Provera treatment is not. First,
the treatment does not permanently mutilate the body and in-
volves only a simple injection. Second, there are no known long-
term effects which affect the offender's future and physiological
changes are reversible with cessation of treatment. Finally, the
drug is not experimental and does not have to be administered for
the life of the offender to be effective. 3
The second test employed by the Court asks whether the pun-
ishment is commesurate to the offense for which it is imposed. 4
This test, which views the seriousness of the punishment in rela-
tion to the gravity of the offense, would again pass Eighth Amend-
ment muster. First, insofar as the offense is viewed as the result of
a sexual illness and not an act of violence, Depo-Provera therapy
provides a more logical approach to "curing" the offender than
does incarceration. If the.offender accepts Depo-Provera treat-
87. 488 F2d 1136 (8th Cir 1973).
88. Knecht, 488 F2d at 1139-1140.
89. 477 F2d 877 (9th Cir 1973).
90. Mackey, 477 F2d at 878.
91. This test was first applied in Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86 (1958).
92. Gregg v Georgia, 428 US 153, 173 (1976).
93. See contra, Green, 12 U Dayton L Rev at 22 (cited in note 48).
94. This test was first applied in Weems v United States, 217 US 349 (1910).
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ment, he can reenter society with state supervision, and he will re-
ceive the needed attention to control his behavior. Second, the
treatment is not excessive because it can be discontinued at the
end of the probation period. Furthermore, the drugs' effects are
fully reversible. Consequently, at least one court has held that pro-
bation with treatments is too lenient and disproportional to
sentences for similar offenses."5
Under the third test,96 the Court must determine whether the
punishment is excessive in relation to the accomplishment of the
states' legitimate aims. As the offender is relieved of his former
sexual urges with Depo-Provera, clearly there is no threat to soci-
ety. Additionally, the practical value in accomplishing the states'
goal of reducing the incidence of rape cannot be accomplished by
less intrusive methods. Depo-Provera treatment, coupled with
therapy, is more likely to lead to rehabilitation than incarceration
alone, which in turn provides greater long-term safety for society.
Privacy Interests
In 1965, the Supreme Court formally announced the right to pri-
vacy in Griswold v Connecticut.9 7 Through the Due Process Clause
95. People v Gauntlett, 134 Mich App 737, 755, 352 NW2d 310, 318 (1984). In Gaun-
tlett (see note 5), the court indicated that the trial judge abused his discretion because the
defendant's sentence was "so significantly disproportionate to the [harsher] sentences gener-
ally imposed on similarly situated defendants." Id.
96. This test was first applied in Furman v Georgia, 408 US 238 (1972). Justice Bren-
nan stated the test as follows:
The test, then, will ordinarily be a cumulative one: If a punishment is unusually se-
vere, if there is a'strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily, if it is substantially
rejected by contemporary society, and if there is no reason to believe that it serves
any penal purpose more effectively than some less severe punishment, then the con-
tinued infliction of that punishment violates the command of the Clause that the
State may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon those convicted of
crimes.
Furman, 408 US at 282.
97. 381 US 479 (1965). The Court offered a number of rationales for the right of
privacy. One view indicated that various guarantees in the Bill of Rights created zones of
privacy. The 1st Amendment protects the right of association with the related privacy, the
3rd Amendment protects privacy of the home. The 4th and 5th Amendments protect other
facets of privacy including the sanctity of the home. The 9th Amendment protects rights.
retained by the people. Griswold, 381 US at 484, Douglas J. plurality). Another view found
that the 9th Amendment expressly recognized fundamental personal rights not specifically
mentioned in the Constitution. To determine which rights are fundamental, judges must
look to traditions and the collective conscious of people. Id at 493 (Goldberg, Brennan and
Warren, concurring). Another view found the right to privacy inherent in the 14th Amend-
ment's "concept of ordered liberty" which protects fundamental rights. Id at 500 (Harlan,
concurring)..
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of the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to privacy also applies to
state action. 8 Inherent in this right of privacy is the protection of
bodily autonomy, which includes a prima facie right to procreative
freedom, the right to refuse intrusive medical treatment, and possi-
bly the right to treatment.
1. The Right to Procreative Freedom
The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to procreate is
"one of the basic civil rights of man."99 Procreation has also been
termed to be "fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race."' 00 This sexual privacy right can be traced to Skinner v
Oklahoma,' wherein the Court held that forced sterilization of
habitual criminals invaded an individual's right to privacy in mar-
riage and procreation.
Opponents of Depo-Provera treatment urge that, like forced
sterilization in Skinner, the effect of Depo-Provera intrudes upon
one's procreative freedom by its effect on the male sex drive. 02
While agreeing that the state has a fundamental interest in pro-
tecting society from sex offenders, critics maintain that such pro-
tection must be accomplished by the least restrictive means.
10 3
Moreover, the means employed must be rationally related to the
end sought. On both grounds, critics contend Depo-Provera treat-
ment fails. 04 Specifically, critics argue that (1) imprisonment
would be a less restrictive alternative to Depo-Provera treatment
and (2) Depo-Provera treatment as a probation condition would
not pass constitutional scrutiny.'05 Noting that government action
must advance a legitimate state interest achieved by a means rea-
sonably related to that goal, opponents urge that Depo-Provera
cannot rationally achieve the goal in the absence of proof of dimin-
ished frequency of rape.1
06
While surgical castration, like a vasectomy, clearly eliminates the
ability to procreate, proponents of Depo-Provera urge that treat-
ment with Depo-Provera does not intrude upon the offender's
98. Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 186, 190 (1986).
99. Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535, 541 (1942).
100. Skinner, 316 US at 541.
101. 316 US 535, 541-2 (1942).
102. Green, 12 U Dayton L Rev at 24-5 (cited in note 48).
103. Id.
104. Id.




rights insofar as consent is given.10 7 In the first instance, Depo-
Provera treatment does not eliminate the capacity for inter-
course.1"8 Furthermore, the effects of Depo-Provera treatment are
only temporary and any reduced ability to procreate would return
to normal upon discontinuing treatment. Moreover, if the offender
was incarcerated, he would be deprived of any conjugal rights any-
way. Additionally, advocates have indicated that Depo-Provera
treatment does reduce sex crimes because it is "clearly effective
during active treatment." 109
2. The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
An individual's privacy interest encompasses a right to bodily
autonomy that includes a prima facie right to refuse intrusive med-
ical treatment."0 This right, however, is not absolute; the individ-
ual's liberty interest must be balanced against the state's interest
in compelling medication. Those state interests considered to out-
weigh the individual's liberty interest include: (1) the protection of
life; (2) the prevention of suicide; (3) the protection of innocent
third parties; and (4) the protection of the medical profession."1
Those desiring to administer Depo-Provera to offenders as a
condition of probation could invoke the third interest, that of pro-
tecting innocent third parties. Evidence indicates that incarcera-
tion alone does not "cure" the offender and ironically, often serves
to intensify the offender's desires to commit such crimes.1 Thus,
incarceration alone only serves to protect innocent third parties
during the period in which the offender is incarcerated. Upon re-
lease, the offender may pose an even greater threat to innocent
third parties than he did before being incarcerated.
In contrast, Depo-Provera treatment quells those sexual desires
which give rise to the offenses. Rather that imprisoning an offender
in an environment which accentuates his dysfunction, the adminis-
tration of Depo-Provera, while on probation, enables an offender to
learn to function in society in a more acceptable manner and ulti-
mately proves less harmful to innocent third parties. Essentially, if
107. Fitzgerald, 18 Am J Crim Law at 44 (cited in note 36).
108. Melella, 17 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law at 225 (cited in note 3).
109. Fitzgerald, 18 Am J Crim L at 44 (cited in note 36).
110. See Rennie v Klein, 720 F2d 266 (1983); Rogers v Okin, 478 F Supp 1342 (D Mass
1979).
111. Harper v State, 110 Wash 2d 873, 759 P2d 358, 364 (1988).
112. See generally Besharov and Vachhs, ABA Journal (cited in note 18); French, 68
Psychological Reports 1195 (cited in note 52).
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the state's interest is truly to protect the public from future sex
crimes, then "rehabilitation" cannot be achieved by less intrusive
means. Clearly, confinement is far more intrusive on the offender's
liberty than Depo-Provera treatment.
3. The Right to Treatment
The Courts first acknowledged a constitutional right to treat-
ment in Wyatt v Stickney.113 In Wyatt, a federal district court,
considering treatment for mental patients, indicated that "To de-
prive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory
that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then
fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals
of due process."11' Essentially, since involuntary commitment rep-
resents a decrease in individual liberty, such confinement can be
justified only if the state provides rehabilitative treatment.11 5
In Arizona v Christopher, a repeat child-molester argued that
being placed on probation constitutionally entitled him to be effec-
tually treated and rehabilitated.'1 6 The Arizona Supreme Court de-
nied the defendant any right to effective treatment, holding that
being placed on probation does not constitutionally entitle a sex
offender to be effectively treated and rehabilitated with Depo-
Provera.117 The court indicated that while rehabilitation is one goal
of penal sanctions, other goals of punishment must not be ig-
nored. 8 Thus, to preserve order, society should consider other fac-
tors such as retribution, restraint of the offender to prevent future
criminal acts, and deterrence of the general population from en-
gaging in crime.1 19
In fact,-in light of the Supreme Court decision in Youngberg v
Romeo, the Supreme Court has been somewhat more reluctant to
posit a constitutional right to treatment.120 Thus, whether an indi-
113. 325 F Supp 781 (MD Ala 1971).
114. Wyatt, 325 F Supp at 785.
115. O'Connor v Donaldson, 422 US 563, 573-76 (1975).
116. 133 Ariz 508, 652 P2d 1031 (Az 1982). In Christopher, the defendant was put on
probation for child molestation. His probation was revoked after defendant violated the
conditions thereof by committing more child molestations. Defendant plead guilty to six of
the violations committed while on probation and was sentenced to 25 years to life. Defend-
ant argued that the state of Arizona had denied him his right to medical treatment when it
did not require him to undergo chemical castration and behavior modification. This, the
defendant contended, precluded the imposition of such a long prison sentence.
117. Christopher, 652 P2d at 1034-35.
118. Id at 1033.
119. Id.
120. 457 US 307 (1982). In Youngberg, Respondent was a mentally retarded individual
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vidual has the right to treatment with Depo-Provera as an exten-
sion of due process remains unanswered. In Youngberg, Justice
Powell, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, indicated that
".. . the State concedes a duty to provide adequate food, shelter,
clothing, and medical care. These are the essentials of the care that
the State must provide." 12'
Although Youngberg involved the right to rehabilitation of a
civilly committed mentally retarded individual, 'it can be applied
by analogy to the sex offender. In Youngberg, the court indicated
that the state was required to rehabilitate the individual with
"minimally adequate or reasonable training." '22 Thus, to the ex-
tent that Depo-Provera causes cessation of sexually offensive acts,
vis-a-vis reduction in testosterone production, as some have sug-
gested, then, arguably, Depo-Provera treatment is a minimally ad-
equate treatment which could prevent the offender from having to
be imprisoned. In fact, at least two courts have ruled that the state
could not refuse to allow an inmate, convicted of rape, to receive
Depo-Provera treatment which had been deemed medically
appropriate. 2 '
However, if the state is required to provide only "essential medi-
cal care" for incarcerated individuals, it is doubtful that the state
would be required to offer Depo-Provera to non-incarcerated per-
sons. In fact, unless Depo-Provera can be categorized as "essential
medical care," it is unlikely that such treatment would be
required. '24
First Amendment
Conditional probation is also subjectto First Amendment scru-
committed to Pennhurst State Hospital. Respondent's mother filed an action on behalf of
Respondent, alleging that Respondent had a constitutional right to safe conditions of con-
finement, freedom from bodily restraint and training or "habilitation". Respondent further
argued that the institutions failure to take preventive procedures after learning of his injury
constituted a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court
held that the Respondent had a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause to reasonably safe conditions of confinement, free
from unreasonable bodily restraint and minimally adequate training. Youngberg, 457 US at
307.
121. Id at 324.
122. Id at 319.
123. See Paoli v Galley, Kaufman, J. Civil #K-74-476 (D Md, May 1975); McDonald v
Warden, State Prison (Connecticut), #32654, Judicial Dist of Hartford,- New Britain
(1983). Cited in Berlin, 17 Bull Am Acad Psych Law at 237 (cited in note 19).




tiny. The First Amendment right to freedom includes a guarantee
of mental autonomy as well as expression, and, within its penum-
bra, a right to privacy. 125 The Supreme Court in Stanley v Geor-
gia126 recognized that free speech includes the "right to receive
information and ideas, regardless of their social worth." 2 Specifi-
cally, the court stated that:
Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of [giving] govern-
ment the powers to control men's minds ... whatever the power of the state
to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it
cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling
a person's private thoughts.128
Subsequently, in Kaimowitz v Department of Mental Health,29
the Court acknowledged that the First Amendment protects the
free flow of ideas from unwarranted intrusions with individual
mental processes. 3 ° Although treatment with Depo-Provera inter-
feres with mentation by decreasing sexual fantasy, the First
Amendment does not prohibit all intrusion on mental autonomy.
In Rennie v Klein, a case involving forced administration of
psychotropic drugs to mental patients, a federal district court
ruled that the determination of whether a drug intrudes upon an
individual's freedom to think or upon his right of privacy is depen-
dent upon the length and persistence of the drugs' effect on the
individual's ability to think and speak.1
3 0
Measured by the Rennie effects test, Depo-Provera treatment
arguably is not so intrusive as to violate the offender's First
Amendment rights. In the first instance, the effects of Depo-
Provera are reversible and are effective only during administration;
the effects of the drug cease with termination of treatment. Fur-
thermore, Depo-Provera does not alter the physiological function-
ing of the mind, but rather only affects one's intensity and preoc-
cupation with compulsive sexual fantasy and restores thoughts to
the boundaries of normalcy. In fact, Depo-Provera actually ex-
pands the offender's capacity to generate thoughts, because it frees
him from compulsive fantasy. However, the offender can still think
about and engage in sex while undergoing treatment. Finally,
125. Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965).
126. 394 US 557 (1969).
127. Stanley, 394 US at 564.
128. Id at 565-566.
129. 299 F Supp 117 (SD NY), (1969).
130. Note, 54 BU L Rev at 303, 328-31 (cited in note 66).
130. 462 F Supp 1131, 1143-44 (D NJ 1978).
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Depo-Provera cannot be administered without the conscious coop-
eration to the offender.
CONCLUSION
In today's society, it is abundantly clear that incarceration alone
is an insufficient deterrent for the sex offender. The occurrence of
sexually deviant crimes continues to rise as more and more offend-
ers are leaving the prison milieu with little or no treatment. Thus,
with the criminal justice system floundering, the state needs to
consider new ways to control sexual offenders.
Depo-Provera is presently the only treatment which has demon-
strated itself to be an effective and highly successful tool in dimin-
ishing sexual paraphilia. Not only does the drug allow the offender
to experience relief from obsessive sexual urges, but it also permits
the offender to become more amenable to therapy. This in turn
will make the offender safer to society and himself and less likely
to repeat his crimes.
With the increase of judicial acceptance, it is clear that Depo-
Provera has and will become an important adjunct to the treat-
ment of certain sex offenders. When given to fully informed indi-
viduals on a voluntary basis, Depo-Provera poses relatively few le-
gal and ethical issues. The offender arguably has the capacity to
decide whether or not to undergo treatment, and the administra-
tion of Depo-Provera does not violate any of the offender's consti-
tutional rights. Autonomy and integrity remain intact, as the treat-
ment is not so intrusive as to infringe on one's thoughts or ideas.
Nor does treatment violate the Eighth Amendment when used for
a legitimate medical purpose. Further, given that the offender is
presented with a choice, the offender's right to privacy remains
sacred.
Based on the foregoing, the state should not deny a convicted
sex offender the right to receive treatment when the state's objec-
tives can be achieved safely through this alternative to incarcera-
tion. In trying to rehabilitate the offender, the protection of poten-
tial victims must be considered. With Depo-Provera treatment,
society, as well as the offender, will benefit if the offender can be
successfully treated rather than being incarcerated and released
unchanged.
As one author suggests:
It must be recognized that the incarceration of paraphiliacs is a futile exer-
cise. Science has provided a treatment which increases the liberty of the
offender, deters future crime, provides public safety, facilitates the rehabili-
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tation of the offender, and strengthens the legitimacy of the criminal law.'3 '
In the absence of a proven method of providing long-term protec-
tion and security for the community from sexual offenders, the no-
tion of Depo-Provera should be pursued. Depo-Provera is not the
modern day "get-out-of-jail-free" card; it is an effective alternative
to the traditional methods of the legal system.
Kimberly A. Peters
131. Fitzgerald, 18 Am J Crim L at 60 (cited in note 36).
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